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CROSS APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
PARTIES 
Petitioner/Appellant/Cross Appellee Kimber Lee Ellison is an individual who on 
information and belief currently resides in Utah County, Utah. 
Respondent/Appellee/Cross Appellant is an individual who is currently serving a 
religious affiliated mission in the Dominican Republic. 
STATEMENT REGARDING JURISDICTION 
Original appellate jurisdiction of this matter was proper before the Utah Supreme 
Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2-(3)(j). Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-4 
the Utah Supreme Court transferred the case to the Court of Appeals. Therefore, this 
Court has jurisdiction pursuant Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: Did the Trial Court err in ruling that Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 
governs the award of attorney's fees involving civil stalking injunctions when the 
applicant's application for fees does not invoke the statutory provision. 
Standard of Review: Whether attorney's fees are recoverable in an action is 
a question of law reviewed for correctness. Dejavue, Inc. v. U.S. Energy Corp., 199 UT 
App 355, lf8, 993 P.2d 222. When reviewing attorney fee decisions that involve 
questions of law or in interpreting statutes, appellant courts review for correctness. A.K. 
& R. Whipple Plumbing v. Guy, 2004 UT 47, Tj 6, 94 P.3d 270. 
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Preservation of Issue: This issue was preserved by the Notice of Appeal 
filed on April 14, 2005. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Appellee/Cross Appellant and Respondent below appeal the Trial Court's denial 
of his Verified Application for Attorney's fees and Costs. 
Petitioner filed a Petition for a Civil Stalking Injunction on October 1, 2004. The 
Trial Court entered an Ex Parte Civil Stalking Injunction the same day. Upon service, 
Respondent timely requested a hearing pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-3a-101(6). The 
hearing was held on November 30, 2004. Petitioner presented her case knd rested. 
Respondent moved for a directed verdict1. After argument of counsel, the Trial Court 
took the matter under advisement. The Trial Court, having previously issued a written 
ruling granting Respondent's motion for directed verdict, entered an Order Dissolving Ex 
Parte Civil Stalking Injunction on December 23, 2004. Respondent filed a Verified 
Application for Attorney's fees and Costs pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-3a-101(16) 
on December 21, 2004. Petitioner filed an objection; Respondent filed a reply and a 
Request to Submit for Decision. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal pertaining to the 
Order Dissolving Ex Parte Civil Stalking Injunction on February 25, 20052. The Trial 
1
 Respondent's Motion for Directed Verdict should have actually been termed as a 
motion to dismiss. Respondent more fully explains this issue in Section II of 
Respondent's Response to Appellant's Brief. For consistency, Respondent will continue 
to refer to the motion as one for directed verdict. 
2
 Petitioner initially filed a Notice of Appeal on December 27, 2004, prior to the 
Trial Court issuing a ruling on Respondent's application for attorney's fees. The appeal 
was transferred to the Court of Appeals by the Supreme Court and was assigned case 
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Court entered an Order Denying Respondent's Verified Application for Attorney's fees 
& Costs on March 15, 2005. Respondent filed a timely Notice of Appeal on April 14, 
2005. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The law regarding motions for directed verdict, as well as motions to dismiss, 
require that all evidence must be considered by the Trial Court in the light most favorable 
to the party against whom the motion is directed. Cerritos Trucking Co. v. Utah 
Development Co., 645 P.2d 608, 612 (Utah 1982) (citations omitted). On appeal, the 
appeals court applies the same rule. Id. Based on this rule of law, Respondent accepts 
Petitioner's facts as set forth in her Appellant Brief as accurate for purposes of analyzing 
Respondent's motion for directed verdict and this cross appeal regarding the denial of 
Respondent's Verified Application for Attorney's Fees and Costs, with the following 
exceptions. First, in Petitioner's Statement of Facts she attempts to provide citations to 
the evidentiary hearing as "(R. at x)". Respondent suggests that the citations are 
inaccurate as they are not citations to the record, but are actually citations to the 
Reporter's Transcript of the Proceedings dated November 30, 2005, which is found in the 
number 20041135-CA. Respondent moved the Court of Appeals to dismiss the appeal 
based on the Order Dissolving Ex Parte Stalking Injunction not being a final appealable 
order. Petitioner conceded and the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal based on the 
lack of jurisdiction on February 4, 2004. The Trial Court entered its ruling on 
Respondent's application for attorney's fees on February 18, 2005. Petitioner filed the 
Notice of Appeal in this case on February 28, 2005. However, since Utah R. Civ. P. 7 
requires an order on the ruling and the fact that the Trial Court had required one on its 
ruling on the Ex Parte Civil Stalking Injunction, Petitioner's Notice of Appeal was 
arguably untimely. However, pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 4(c), Respondent did not 
object since Petitioner presented an order, which the Trial Court entered on March 15, 
2005. 
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record at 152 (hereinafter referred to as "R 152 at x"). In addition, in Petitioner's 
Statement of Facts she provides citations to counsel's opening statements, which are not 
evidentiary in nature. 
The only substantive evidence Respondent presented in this matter was his 
Verified Application for Attorney's Fees and Costs, which was simply verified by 
counsel as to the nature of the proceedings and the necessity and reasonableness of the 
fees. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Respondent requested an award of attorney's fees and costs based solely on the 
statutory authority to award attorney's fees found at Utah Code § 77-3a-101(16). In her 
objection to Respondent's application, Petitioner asserted that Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-
56 supplements the attorney's fee provisions in § 77-3a-101(16). Petitioner analyzed her 
position using the three-prong test articulated in Chipman v. Miller, 934 P.2d 1158 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1997). The Trial Court, in issuing its ruling on the application for attorney's 
fees ruled that Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 governs the award of attorney's fees in actions 
involving civil stalking injunctions. 
The Trial Court applied the three-prong test set forth in Chipman. The Trial Court 
concluded that Respondent satisfied the first prong but did not satisfy the second and 
third prongs and denied Respondent's request for fees and costs on that basis. 
The Trial Court erred in ruling that Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 governs the award 
of attorney's fees involving civil stalking injunctions when the applicant's application for 
fees does not invoke the statutory provision. Since the Respondent only based his 
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application for fees and costs on the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 77-3a-101(16), the 
Trial Court should have conducted its analysis under that specific statutory scheme. The 
Trial Court erred in conducting its analysis under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 and the 
matter must be remanded for an analysis under Utah Code Ann. § 77-3a-101(16). 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78-27-56 GOVERNS THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES 
INVOLVING CIVIL STALKING INJUNCTIONS WHEN THE 
APPLICANT'S APPLICATION FOR FEES DOES NOT INVOKE 
THE STATUTORY PROVISION. 
Utah adheres to the prevailing common-law rule that attorney's fees are not 
recoverable in the absence of a contractual or statutory basis. Dixie State Bank v. 
Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988-89 (Utah Ct.App.1988). In the present case, Respondent 
requested an award of his attorney's fees and costs based only on the statutory authority 
to award fees found at Utah Code Ann. §77-3a-101(16). The Trial Court concluded that 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 governed the application. 
To the extent the Trial Court analyzed Respondent's application for fees under 
both statutes, the standard for award are in conflict and therefore the Trial Court erred in 
applying one standard over the other. 
When appellate courts are faced with two statutes that purport to cover the same 
subject, they seek to determine the legislature's intent as to which applies. Taghipour v. 
Jerez, 2002 UT 74, f 11, 52 P.3d 1252 (citations omitted). Appellate courts follow one 
general rule of statutory construction, which provides that the best evidence of legislative 
intent is the plain language of the statute. Id. at f 13. In addition, to determine legislative 
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intent, our rules of statutory construction provide that "when two statutory provisions 
conflict in their operation, the provision more specific in application governs over the 
more general provision." Id at f 11. 
Title 77, Utah Code of Criminal Procedure, Chapter 3a Stalking Injunctions, 
Section 101, Civil Stalking Injunction - Petition - Ex Parte Injunction, (16) provides: 
"After a hearing with notice to the affected party, the court may enter an order requiring 
any party to pay the costs of the action, including reasonable attorney's fees." 
Title 78, Judicial Code, Chapter 27, Miscellaneous Provisions, Section 56, Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-27-56 Attorney's fees—Award where action or defense in bad faith— 
Exceptions provides: 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing 
party if the court determines that the action or defense to the action was without 
merit and not brought or asserted in good faith, except under Subsection (2). 
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a party 
under Subsection (1), but only if the court: 
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the action before the 
court; or 
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees under the 
provisions of Subsection (1). 
Respondeat requested an award of his attorney's fees and costs based solely on the 
attorney's fee provision contained in § 77-3a-101(16). Respondent did not request his 
attorney's fees based on the contention that Petitioner's application for a Civil Stalking 
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Injunction was made in bad faith or was meritless.3 Petitioner, in her objection to 
Respondent's application, asserted that the application for attorney's fees should be 
analyzed under both § 77-3a-101(16) and § 78-27-56. Although the Trial Court 
recognized that § 77-3a-101(16) grants the trial court discretion in awarding attorney's 
fees and costs, (Ruling on Verified Application for Attorney's Fees and Costs; R. at 137), 
the Trial Court ruled that Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 governs the award of attorney's 
fees in actions involving civil stalking injunctions (Id.; R at 138). The Trial Court did not 
conduct an analysis under § 77-3a-101(16). 
In determining whether the Trial Court incorrectly applied § 78-27-56, this Court 
need look no further than the plain language of each statutory provision. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-27-56's title clearly indicates when the legislature intended this statutory provision 
to apply i.e. "Attorney's fees-Award where action or defense in bad faith—Exceptions", 
(emphasis added). The plain language of subsection (1) directs the trial court to award 
fees "to a prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the action 
was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith". Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-
56(1). Clearly Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 is to be used where a prevailing party 
requests the court to award fees because the action or defense was without merit and not 
brought or asserted in good faith. However, there is no language in § 78-27-56 that 
supports the proposition that it should supplement other statutory provisions that allow 
for an award of attorney's fees. An exhaustive search of Utah case law presents no 
3
 Respondent reserves the right to base his claim for an award of attorney's fees on 
bad faith if this matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with Section II of 
Appellee's Response to Appellant's Brief. 
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precedent in which a trial court applied § 78-27-56 as a supplement to another statutory 
provision allowing for an award of attorney's fees. In substantially all the reported cases 
regarding this issue, the trial court was requested to make a determination that the 
prevailing party was entitled to an award of fees based on the "bad faith" or "meritless" 
standard. See generally: Wardley Better Homes and Gardens v. Cannon, 2002 UT 99, 
f23, 61 P.3d 1009; Warner v. DMG Color, Inc., 2000 UT 102, ^21, 20 P.3d 868; 
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305 (Utah 1998); Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 1188, 
1199 (Utah 1993); Chipman v. Miller, 934 P.2d 1158 (Utah Ct. App 1997). 
In reviewing the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 77-3a-101(16) it is 
abundantly clear that the Utah Legislature intended that in cases where a "hearing" is 
requested, and held, pursuant Utah Code Ann. § 77-3a-101(6)(a), the trial court "may" 
award any party the costs of the hearing, including reasonable attorney's fees. 
Subsection 16 slates in relevant part that "After a hearing...the court may enter an order 
requiring any party to pay the costs of the action, including reasonable attorney's fees." 
In resolving conflicting statutes the more specific statute will prevail over the 
more general statute. Taghipour, supra. Section 78-27-56 is found in the Judicial Code 
Title of the Utah Code in a chapter containing miscellaneous provisions. Section 77-3a-
101(16) is found in the Title containing the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure in a chapter 
pertaining exclusively to Civil Stalking Injunctions. The more specific statute is clearly 
the one which on its face specifically references hearings on civil stalking injunctions and 
specifically provides the trial court discretion to order one party to pay costs of the 
hearing, including attorney's fees. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court incorrectly determined that Respondent's application for 
attorney's fees and costs was governed by Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 when his 
application was submitted pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-3a-101(16). Respondent 
respectfully requests that the matter be remanded with instructions that the Trial Court 
review and analyze Respondent's application for attorney's fees and costs exclusively 
under Utah Code Ann. § 77-3a-101(16). 
APPELLEE'S RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
I. THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED THE PROPER LAW IN DETERMINING 
WHETHER A PERMANENT STALKING INJUNCTION SHOULD 
ENTER. 
Petitioner suggests that the Trial Court erred in applying the definition of 
"emotional distress" as set forth in Salt Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997) because Lopez was criminal in nature and this matter is civil in nature. In addition, 
Petitioner argues that the Trial Court erred in misinterpreting the plain text of Utah's civil 
stalking statute found at Utah Code Ann. § 77-3a-101. Second, Petitioner urges this Court 
to find that even if the Trial Court correctly applied Lopez to this case, that the Lopez 
definition should be "downplayed" in application to civil stalking injunctions on public 
policy grounds. Finally, Petitioner argues that the Trial Court erred in not considering the 
accumulative effect of Respondent's alleged conduct. Respondent disagrees with all of 
Petitioner's assertions. 
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A. The Trial Court Correctly Applied The Definition Of Emotional 
Distress As Set Forth In Salt Lake City v. Lopez 
The text of Utah Code Ann. § 77-3a-101(l) is unambiguous and clear and reads in 
relevant part: "As used in this chapter, "stalking" means the crime of stalking as defined in 
Section 76-5-106.5." Section 77-3a-101(l) is explicit in directing the reader to the criminal 
stalking statute for the definition of "stalking". In fact, § 77-3a-101(l) contains no other 
legal framework or additional elements; the legal framework and elements necessary for a 
civil stalking injunction to issue are exclusively set forth in Section 76-5-106.5. 
Consequently, the Trial Court correctly referred to, analyzed, and applied § 76-5-106.5 in 
determining whether a permanent stalking injunction pursuant to § 77-3a-101 should issue. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5(1) defines three terms which are incorporated into the 
elements of the stalking statute. Subsection (a) defines "Course of Conduct"; (b) defines 
"Immediate family"; and (c) defines "Repeatedly". The Utah Legislature elected to only 
define these terms. Respondent suggests that this is because all other terms regarding the 
elements of stalking are already well defined in Utah law. 
The primary source of guidance in statutory interpretation is the plain and ordinary 
meaning of the statutory language. State v. Mooney, 2004 UT 49, % 11, 98 P.3d 420. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5(2) states: 
2) A person is guilty of stalking who: 
(a) intentionally or knowingly engages in a course of conduct directed at 
a specific person that would cause a reasonable person: 
(i) to fear bodily injury to himself or a member of his immediate 
family; or 
(ii) to suffer emotional distress to himself or a member of his immediate 
family; 
(b) has knowledge or should have knowledge that the specific person: 
10 
(i) will be placed in reasonable fear of bodily injury to himself or a 
member of his immediate family; or 
(ii) will suffer emotional distress or a member of his immediate family 
will suffer emotional distress; and 
(c) whose conduct: 
(i) induces fear in the specific person of bodily injury to himself or a 
member of his immediate family; or 
(ii) causes emotional distress in the specific person or a member of his 
immediate family. 
Each word as set forth in the elements of § 76-5-106.5(2) are either of such plain ordinary 
meaning that; 1) no reasonable person would argue a contrary interpretation, 2) have been 
previously considered by Utah Appellate Courts and articulated in legal precedent, or 3) 
have been defined by the legislature in other areas of the Utah code. For example, the term 
of "emotional distress" is defined in Lopez, supra.; while the definitions of intentionally 
and knowingly are defined in Utah Code Ann. §76-2-103. 
The Trial Court correctly articulated each element of § 76-5-106.5(2) when it 
issued its ruling. Petitioner, who had the burden of proof, was required to establish a 
prima facia case by presenting sufficient evidence that stalking had occurred. (Ruling 
on Motion for Directed Verdict; R. 91). An essential element of Petitioner's claim was 
that she suffered "emotional distress". 
In assessing Petitioner's claims, the Trial Court was required to evaluate each 
element to determine if stalking had occurred. If sufficient proof regarding any of the 
elements set forth in § 76-5-106.5(2) was found lacking, the trial court can dismiss the 
petition upon defendant's motion. Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b). In the present case, Respondent 
raised the issue that Petitioner had failed to present sufficient evidence of "emotional 
distress" and therefore was entitled to have the Trial Court consider a dismissal. 
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Emotional distress results from conduct that is "outrageous and intolerable in that 
it offends the generally accepted standards of decency and morality." Lopez, supra. 
(citing Russell v. Thompson Newspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 896, 905 (Utah 1992)). Lopez 
was a challenge to the constitutionality of § 76-5-106.5(2), in that it failed to define 
"emotional distress", thus rendering the statute both overbroad and vauge. This Court 
held that § 76-5-106.5(2) is not facially vague for failing to define "emotional distress" as 
that phrase is well defined in Utah. Lopez at 1265. The Trial Court is obligated by the 
doctrine of stare decisis to refer to Lopez for the definition of emotional distress. State v. 
Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d 289, 292 (Utah 1995). 
Petitioner argues that "no Utah appellate court has ever defined "emotional 
distress" for purposes of establishing "emotional distress" under the state's civil stalking 
statute..." However, the term "emotional distress" need not be redefined from one statute 
to the next. No separate definition is needed, nor was it intended by the Utah Legislature. 
Because Utah Code Ann. §77-3a-101(l) expressly refers to § 76-5-106.5 for its definition 
of stalking in determining whether a civil stalking injunction should issue, the Trial Court 
properly relied on legal interpretations of §76-5-106.5 to define "emotional distress". 
It is interesting to note that Petitioner argues that the "tort law" definition should 
not be used in regards to the civil stalking statute because it was defined by a criminal 
case interpreting a criminal statute. Petitioner's logic is somewhat confusing. Since the 
definition of "emotional distress" used by the Lopez court originates from civil cases, one 
would think that it would be more appropriate to use the "tort law" definition in cases of 
civil stalking. 
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Petitioner's concern appears to be that by using the Lopez definition of emotional 
distress, the Trial Court "tacitly" applied the criminal standard of proof "beyond a 
reasonable doubt" rather than the statutory required "preponderance of the evidence" as 
set forth in Utah Code Ann. §77-3a-101(6)(a) & (7). Petitioner marshals no evidence that 
the Trial Court applied the wrong standard of proof. The Trial Court was clearly made 
aware of the preponderance standard. (R152 at 25) In addition, Petitioner failed to 
properly preserve this issue for appeal. Petitioner had the opportunity to object to the 
Order Dissolving Ex Parte Stalking Injunction as required by Utah R. Civ. P.7.4 (R. at 
110). Petitioner failed to object to the Order Dissolving Ex Parte Stalking Injunction. 
(Id.). One who fails to object to a written order when submitted in accordance with the 
rules of civil procedure, waives their right to raise the issue on appeal. Evans v. State, 
963 P.2d 177, 180 (Utah 1998)(deciding issue under Utah R. Jud. Admin. 4-504). 
The Trial Court correctly referred to, analyzed, and applied § 76-5-106.5 in 
determining whether a permanent stalking injunction pursuant to § 77-3a-103 should 
issue against Respondent. The Trial Court's ruling must be affirmed. 
B. Petitioner's Public Policy Argument To Clarify The Lopez Definition 
Of Emotional Distress Is Better Left To The Utah Legislature-
Petitioner urges the Court to "downplay" the emphasis on the tort-law component 
of the Lopez definition of emotional distress in the name of "public policy". However, as 
Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f)(2) provides in part: Objections to the proposed order shall be filed 
within five days after service. The party preparing the order shall file the proposed order 
upon being served with an objection or upon expiration of the time to object. 
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the Honorable Justice Wilkins recently articulated, it is not the role of this Court to 
interfere with the legislative process: 
This court should not pass judgment on legislative policy such as whether a 
new remedy is as good as the old one, whether the substitute remedy is 
"substantially equal in value" to the old one. Substitution of the policy of 
three or more judges for the policy of the legislature, absent specific 
constitutional authority, is contrary to our system of government....As 
Justice Crockett stated in Stoker v. Stoker, this court should leave it to the 
legislature, who represent the will of the people, and whose function and 
prerogative it is to discuss and consider public policy and enact into law 
those policies that, in their judgment, best serve the public welfare. 616 
P.2d 590, 592 (Utah 1980). (Crockett, J., dissenting). We should adhere to 
the constitutionally prescribed separation of powers doctrine, and not 
intrude into the legislature's prerogative to change the law. Id. Instead, we 
should exercise judicial restraint, keeping our ideas as to what the law 
ought to be in check. Id. In upholding the constitution and ensuring that the 
legislature does not step outside of its constitutional restraints, we must not 
permit ourselves to stray into the legislative arena, thereby creating the risk 
that the policy judgment of three or more members of this court as to what 
the law ought to be will override the policy judgment of the legislative 
body, those most directly accountable to the people. 
Laney v. Fairview City, 2002 UT 79, TJ107, 57 P.3d 1007 (Wilkins, M. dissenting). 
The plain and ordinary language of the civil stalking statute is clear and 
unambiguous. As set forth in Section A of this brief, the Utah Legislature unquestionably 
intended to use the criminal stalking statute to define the elements for issuing civil 
stalking injunctions. By its actions in using § 76-5-106.5 in defining stalking for purposes 
of §77-3a-103, the Utah Legislature undoubtedly expected the civil stalking to be 
analyzed in the context of the criminal statute. For this Court to "downplay" the Lopez 
definition as suggested by Petitioner is the equivalent of amending the statute. Such 
actions of the judiciary are inappropriate and clearly constitute an abuse of power. 
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Respondent urges this Court to employ judicial restraint and simply review this case 
based on plain and ordinary language that the Utah Legislature choose to utilize. 
C. The Trial Court Correctly Considered Each Incident Of Alleged 
Stalking Independently In Determining Whether Stalking Had 
Occurred, 
"Course of conduct" and "repeatedly" are defined in Utah Code Ann. §76-
5-106.5(1). Again the Trial Court correctly referred to, analyzed, and applied § 76-5-
106.5(1) in determining whether Respondent "engaged in a course of conduct" directed at 
Petitioner. Course of conduct, when defined with the inclusion of the definition of 
repeatedly means: "on two or more occasions maintaining a visual or physical proximity to 
a person..." The plain and ordinary language of § 76-5-106.5 suggests to the reader to 
analyze the facts to determine whether there exists more than one occasion when an 
individual maintained a visual or physical proximity to a person. 
Petitioner claims that § 76-5-106.5 directs that the cumulative effect be taken into 
consideration. (Appellant's Brief at page 32). There is nothing in the plain language of § 
76-5-106.5 that directs, instructs, demands, or requires the trier of fact to analyze the 
cumulative effect of "two or more occasions" on the alleged victim. Occasion is defined 
as "An event or happening; an incident" and "The time at which an event occurs". 
American Heritage College Dictionary, 3rd Ed. 943 (1993). The Trial Court 
distinguished each incident of alleged stalking, applied the allegations to the elements of 
the stalking statute, and determined which incidents met the statutory definition of 
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stalking. The Trial Court correctly interpreted the plain language of § 76-5-106.5 as a 
matter of law, and this Court must affirm. 
II. EVEN IF THIS COURT DETERMINES THAT THE TRIAL COURT 
ERRED IT MUST REMAND FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS 
CONSISTENT WITH UTAH R. CIV. P. 41(b). 
At the conclusion of Petitioner's case, Respondent moved for a "directed verdict". 
The Trial Court granted Respondent's motion for "directed verdict". Petitioner appeals 
from the judgment granting Respondents motion for "directed verdict". Although 
throughout the district court proceedings, and in this appeal, the parties and the Trial Court 
use the term "directed verdict", as a matter of law, Respondent's motion was actually one 
to dismiss. Grossen v. Dewitt, 1999 UT App 167,1J8, 982 P.2d 581. In the context of a 
bench trial where there is no jury verdict, the directed verdict's procedural counterpart is a 
motion to dismiss. Id (citing 75A Am.Jur.2d Trial § 855 (1991) ("When a case is tried 
by the court without a jury, and a defendant moves for a judgment at the close of the 
plaintiffs case, the defendant is seeking an involuntary dismissal, not a directed 
verdict.")).5 
Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b) addresses involuntary dismissals as follows: 
[A]fter the plaintiff, in an action tried by the court without a jury, has 
completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant, without waiving 
his right to offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move 
for a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has 
shown no right to relief. The court as trier of the facts may then determine 
5
 In order to stay consistent with the district court proceedings, Appellant's Brief, and 
Appellee's Brief, Respondent will continue to refer to the motion to dismiss as one for 
directed verdict. 
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them and render judgment against the plaintiff or may decline to render any 
judgment until the close of all the evidence. If the court renders judgment on 
the merits against the plaintiff, the court shall make findings as provided in 
Rule 52(a). 
Pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b) the court may dismiss if "(1) the claimant has failed to 
introduce sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case, or (2) the trial court is not 
persuaded by that evidence." Grossen, at [^8. As with a directed verdict, whether 
dismissal was appropriate for failure to make a prima facie case is a question of law 
reviewed for correctness. Id. (citations omitted). Trial courts, as well as appellate courts, 
on a motion to dismiss, are obliged to construe the facts in the light most favorable to 
the plaintiff and to indulge all reasonable inferences in its favor. Burnett v. Utah Power 
& Light Co., 797 P.2d 1096, 1097 (Utahl990). 
Petitioner, throughout her brief, misapplies the Trial Court's findings of fact and 
suggests that she presented prima facia evidence of stalking and therefore a permanent 
stalking injunction should be entered by this Court. Respondent made his motion for 
directed verdict at the conclusion of Petitioner's case after which the Trial Court took 
the matter under advisement. As stated in its Ruling on Motion for Directed Verdict and 
its Order Dissolving Ex Parte Stalking Injunction, the Trial Court found facts in the light 
most favorable to the Petitioner. The Trial Court's Ruling on Motion for Directed 
Verdict clearly indicates that the Trial Court's findings were: "For the purpose of this 
motion only,...". (Ruling on Motion for Directed Verdict; R. at 89). The Trial Court 
determined that Petitioner was sexually assaulted because it had too, as a matter of law, 
in analyzing the motion to dismiss. However, because Respondent has a right to present 
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contrary evidence, evidence of bias, and raise issues of credibility pursuant to Utah R. 
Civ. P. 41(b), it is mere speculation as to what findings a trier of fact would make after a 
full, complete, and fair examination of the facts. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b) provides in part that: "...the defendant, without waiving his 
right to offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal 
on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief." 
(emphasis added). In the present case, Respondent has never waived his right to offer 
evidence. In fact, Respondent was prepared to move forward with the proceedings if the 
Trial Court denied his motion. (R. 152 at 301, et al.) 
Respondent has a right to have all the facts concerning Petitioner's allegations 
examined if this Court finds that the Trial Court erred and the motion for directed 
verdict should not have been granted. Respondent has evidence that neither an 
assault nor stalking occurred (R. 152 at 25, 26, 301 & 302)6. Respondent is entitled 
to have this matter remanded for further proceedings if this Court determines that the 
Trial Court erred as a matter of law or if the Trial Court erroneously applied the 
facts, as suggesled by Petitioner. 
6
 As he stated in his Reply to Objection to Verified Application for Attorney's Fees and 
Costs (R. at 116-119), Respondent is possibly at a disadvantage having had the Trial 
Court grant his motion for directed verdict because the Trial Court did not get to 
review his side of the story. The history of this case includes Respondent being 
wrongfully accused of the crime of sexual assault, a 3rd degree felony, wrongfully 
accused of violating College of Eastern Utah Student Code, a basis for immediate 
expulsion, and wrongfully being accused of stalking in this matter. The Carbon 
County attorney refused to prosecute, the CEU student judiciary found no supportable 
evidence of a student code violation, in part because Respondent passed a polygraph 
exam which Petitioner refused to take, and the Trial Court below found that stalking 
had not occurred, even upon reviewing the facts in the light most favorable to Petitioner. 
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III. THE ISSUE OF WHETHER RESPONDENT VIOLATED THE EX 
PARTE CIVIL STALKING INJUNCTION WAS NOT BEFORE THE 
TRIAL COURT. 
Petitioner alleges that the Trial Court erred in its interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-
5-106.5 by not finding that a violation of an Ex Parte Stalking Injunction is grounds for entry of 
a permanent stalking injunction and by not entering one on that basis. First, Petitioner failed to 
preserve this issue for appeal; and second, Petitioner's interpretation of the Utah Code is 
erroneous. 
A, Petitioner Failed To Preserve This Issue for Appeal. 
After counsel argued Respondent's motion for directed verdict the Trial Court 
inquired of counsel their respective positions on how the Trial Court should treat the 
alleged violations after October 5, 2004, the date the Ex Parte Stalking Injunction was 
issued by the Trial Court. Petitioner takes the position that any violations of the Ex Parte 
Stalking Injunction is immediate grounds for entry of a permanent injunction. (R. 152 at 
292)(Appellant's Brief at 40). 
The Trial Court questioned whether the issue of enforcement of violating the 
Ex Parte Stalking Injunction was properly before the Court. (R.152 at 303). Although 
Petitioner raised the issue, she failed to provide the Trial Court any relevant legal 
authority as required by Utah law. In fact, the Trial Court specifically asked Petitioner 
for supporting law, and Petitioner responded: 
"If I bring that to the attention of—of Commissioner Patton, up in Provo, he will 
immediately enter. If I can provide credible evidence that the ex parte protective 
order was violated, then he will immediately enter the ex—the permanent 
protective order." 
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(R 152 at 292:3-6). Petitioner, after several minutes of attempting to provide the Trial 
Court legal authority, stated again: 
"I would have to research it a little bit, cause I can't tell you that statute off the top 
of my head. All I know is that it's in - in Commissioner Patton's courtroom it's his 
practice to immediately enter a protective order upon evidence that, ah, ex parte 
protective order has been violated." 
(Mat 295:15-21). 
A party must introduce to the trial court "supporting evidence or relevant legal 
authority" to support its argument. Tolman v. Winchester Hills Water Co., 9Y1 P.2d 
457, 461 (Utah Ct.App.1996) (citation omitted). Although Petitioner attempted to direct 
the Trial Court to legal authority, she never did. The Trial Court specifically informed 
Petitioner that he was not satisfied that that is the law. (R152 at 303:8-9). 
Therefore, as a matter of law, Petitioner failed to preserve this issue for appeal. 
This Court will not hear issues not properly presented in the Trial Court and raised for the 
first time in appeal. Tolman, 912 P.2d at 461. 
B. The Plain Language of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-106.5 and 77-3a-103(2) 
Does Not Support Petitioner's Assertion that A Violation of an Ex 
Parte Stalking Injunction is Immediate Grounds for Entry of a 
Permanent Injunction. 
Petitioner raised the issue of entry of a permanent injunction based on a violation 
in the context the Trial Court's inquiry into how it should treat alleged stalking occurring 
after the Ex Parte Stalking Injunction issued. Petitioner did not address the issue outside 
of this context. Petitioner's assertion in her brief that Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5 and 
or Utah Code Ann. § 77-3a-103(2) provides that a violation of an Ex Parte Stalking 
Injunction is grounds for entry of a permanent stalking injunction is not supported by the 
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plain language of either statute. Neither statute states, refers, infers or otherwise provides 
as Petitioner suggests. Petitioner simply adds language that does not appear in either 
statute. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-3a-103(2) in clear, plain and ordinary language sets forth the 
procedure that a petitioner must follow in order to prosecute alleged violations i.e. "by a 
civil action initiated by the petitioner, a criminal action initiated by a prosecuting 
attorney, or both." According to its plain language, the statute requires the petitioner to 
"initiate a civil action". Utah R. Civ. P. 3 Commencement of Action, provides in part: 
"(a) How commenced. A civil action is commenced (1) by filing a complaint with the 
court..." If Petitioner wanted to avail herself of the statutory remedy set forth in Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-3a-103(2) she needed to either file a separate action, complain to the 
local prosecuting attorney, or both. Petitioner did neither. 
Petitioner urges this Court to find that the Trial Court erred by: 1) not interpreting § 
76-5-106.5 to require entry of a permanent injunction upon a violation of a Ex Parte 
Stalking Injunction; and 2) not making specific findings that Respondent's conduct was a 
violation of the Ex Parte Stalking Injunction. As set forth above, the statute does not 
require the Trial Court to enter a permanent injunction upon evidence of a violation and 
therefore the Trial Court correctly interpreted and applied the statute. 
Finally, as set forth in Section II of this response brief, Respondent has an absolute 
right to present evidence in his defense pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b) and does not 
waive said right by motioning to dismiss. Respondent has not waived the right. 
Therefore, to the extent that this Court finds the Trial Court in error for not entering a 
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permanent stalking injunction, this matter must be remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with the prayer set forth in Section II herein. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent finds no err in the Trial Court's legal conclusions and no abuses of 
discretion in the Trial Court's findings. The Trial Court should be affirmed in granting 
Respondent's motion for a directed verdict. 
DATED this 1 8 - day of October, 2005 
PETERSON REED WARLAUMONT & STOUT 
Michael A. Stout 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Cross 
Appellant's Brief and Appelle's Response to Appellant's Brief, this j$^day of October 
2005, to the following: 
Patricia Abbott, Esq. 
Utah Legal Services, Inc. 
455 North University Avenue, Suite 100 
Provo, Utah 84601 
DATED this I8~ day of October, 2005 
PETERSON REED WARLAUMONT & STOUT 
Michael A. Stout 
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MAR I 5 n'-
S E VCKnH DISTRICT 
COURT/CARBON 
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
149 East 100 South, Price, Utah 84501 
KIMBER LEE ELLISON, 
ORDER DENYING RESPONDENT'S 
Petitioner, VERIFIED APPLICATION FOR 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
vs. 
JOSHUA D STAM, Case No 040700756 
Respondent Judge Bryner 
This issue was before the Court on the Respondent's Verified Application for Attorney's 
Fees and Costs, filed on December 21,2004 seeldng attorney's fees of $4,700 00 and costs of 
$78.39 inclined by the respondent in this action. The petitioner filed an Objection on 
December 30,2004, to which the respondent responded with a Reply on December 27,2004. 
The respondent having submitted a Request to Submit for Decision on December 27,2004, 
the matter was ripe for decision. 
The respondent brought his motion under Section 77~3a-101(16) of Utah Code 
Annotated, which states the following: 
(16) After a bearing with notice to the affected party, the court may enter 
an order requiring any party to pay the costs of the action, including 
reasonable attorney's fees 
In addition, the court determined that U.C.A. § 78-27-56 applies to govern the award of 
attorney's fees in actions involving a civil stalking injunction This section, as interpreted by 
CMpmanv.Miller, 934 R2d 1158,1161 (Utah App. 1997) dictates that in order to find that a 
respondent is entitled to attorney fees the court m,ust find: (1) the respondent prevailed; (2) 
the claim asserted by the petitioner was without merit; and (3) the petitioner's claim must not 
have been brought or asserted in good faith. 
This court finds that the first prong of this test was satisfied in that the respondent 
prevailed as the court granted his motion for a directed verdict. This court does not find that 
the second and third prongs were satisfied. The court determines that this case has merit and 
was brought in good faith. Therefore, section 78-27-56 is not satisfied, and the motion for an 
award of attorney's fees and costs is denied. This decision having been fully set forth in the 
court's Ruling on Verified Application for Attorney's Fees and Costs on February 18,2005, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, DECREED, AND ADJUDGED: 
Respondent's Verified Application for Attorney's Fees and Costs is denied. All parties 
shall bear their own costs and attorney's fees heretofore incurred in this action. 
DATED this /& day of ^g^-€M^
 2005. 
BY THE COURT: 
2 
Approved as to form this day of __ , 2005, 
Michael Stout 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I faxed and mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order 
Denying Respondent's Verified Application for Attorney's Fees and Costs, via facsimile and 
US Mad postage prepaid this $ day of NAflJuJK 2005 to the following 
Michael E. Stout 
Peterson Reed & Warlaumont, LX.C. 
800 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 36M060- facsimile 
•WJSL. ' " " - ^ 
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FEB 1 8 2005 
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND 1 0 1 ' 
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH | SEVENTH DISTWCTXOURTS 
FILED 
1 
KIMBER LEE ELLISON, 
Petitioner, 
VS. 
JOSHUA DARREN STAM, 
Respondent. 




Case No. 040700756 
Judge Bryce K. Bryner 
An evidentiary hearing on the petitioner's Ex Parte Civil Stalking Injunction was held on 
November 30, 2004. At the conclusion of the petitioner's case, the court granted the 
respondent's motion for a directed verdict and dissolved the Ex Parte Stalking Injunction. On 
December 21, 2004, the respondent filed a Verified Application for Attorney's Fees and Costs 
seeking attorney fees of $4,700.00 for 47 hours of work, and costs of $78.39. The petitioner filed 
an Objection to which the respondent filed a Reply. The matter is ripe for decision. 
The respondent brings his motion under authority of Section 77-3a-101(16) Utah Code 
Annotated, which provides as follows: 
(16) After a hearing with notice to the affected party, the 
court may enter an order requiring any party to pay the 
costs of the action, including reasonable attorney's fees. 
It is clear that the foregoing statute grants the court discretion in awarding attorney's fees 
and costs. The respondent argues, however, that the standard to be applied by the court in 
exercising its discretion is a "fairness" standard whereas the petitioner contends the court's 
discretion is limited by the provisions of Section 78-27-56 Utah Code Annotated, which reads: 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's 
fees to a prevailing party if the court determines that the action 
of defense to the action was without merit and not brought or 
asserted in good faith.. . 
The court is persuaded that Section 78-27-56 governs the awarding of an attorney fee in 
actions involving a civil stalking injunction. Thus, in order to find that the respondent is entitled 
to an attorney fee the court must find: (1) the respondent prevailed; (2) the claim asserted by the 
petitioner was without merit; and (3) the petitioner's claim must not have been brought or 
asserted in good faith. Chipman v. Miller, 934 P.2d 1158, 1161 (Utah App. 1997). 
The court finds that the first prong of the test has been met - the respondent prevailed 
inasmuch as the court granted the motion for directed verdict. However, the court finds that the 
second and third prongs have not been satisfied. Specifically, the claim brought by the petitioner 
had serious merit and was brought in good faith. The court previously found that the petitioner 
had been the victim of a vicious sexual assault committed by the respondent resulting in the 
petitioner experiencing anxiety and panic when she was around the respondent subsequent to the 
assault. It was therefore reasonable that the petitioner would seek to limit the respondent's 
ability to be in her presence through the means of a stalking injunction. Moreover, the 
respondent has not shown that the petitioner's claim was frivolous or that it was of little weight 
or importance having no basis in law or fact. To the contrary, the court finds that the petitioner's 
claim that the respondent was stalking her had a supportable basis in fact even though the 
petitioner did not prevail. 
Because the respondent has not satisfied all three requirements of 78-27-56 (1) the motion 
for an award of attorney's fees and costs is denied. 
DATED this 18th day of February, 2005. 
g^r^ 
ryce K. Bryner, Jud, 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 77-3a-101 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 
^^Chapter 3A. Stalking Injunctions fRefs & Annos) 
••§ 7 7 - 3 a - 1 0 1 . Civil stalking injunction—Petition—Ex parte injunction 
(1) As used in this chapter, "stalking" means the crime of stalking as defined in Section 
76-5-106.5. Stalking injunctions may not be obtained against law enforcement officers, 
governmental investigators, or licensed private investigators, acting in their official 
capacity. 
(2) Any person who believes that he or she is the victim of stalking may file a verified 
written petition for a civil stalking injunction against the alleged stalker with the district 
court in the district in which the petitioner or respondent resides or in which any of the 
events occurred. A minor with his or her parent or guardian may file a petition on his or 
her own behalf, or a parent, guardian, or custodian may file a petition on the minor's 
behalf. 
(3) The Administrative Office of the Courts shall develop and adopt uniform forms for 
petitions, ex parte civil stalking injunctions, civil stalking injunctions, service and any 
other necessary forms in accordance with the provisions of this chapter on or before 
July 1, 2001. The office shall provide the forms to the clerk of each district court. 
(a) All petitions, injunctions, ex parte injunctions, and any other necessary forms 
shall be issued in the form adopted by the Administrative Office of the Courts. 
(b) The offices of the court clerk shall provide the forms to persons seeking to 
proceed under this chapter. 
(4) The petition for a civil stalking injunction shall include: 
(a) the name of the petitioner; however, the petitioner's address shall be disclosed to 
the court for purposes of service, but, on request of the petitioner, the address may 
not be listed on the petition, and shall be protected and maintained in a separate 
document or automated database, not subject to release, disclosure, or any form of 
public access except as ordered by the court for good cause shown; 
(b) the name and address, if known, of the respondent; 
(c) specific events and dates of the actions constituting the alleged stalking; 
(d) if there is a prior court order concerning the same conduct, the name of the court 
in which the order was rendered; and 
(e) corroborating evidence of stalking, which may be in the form of a police report, 
affidavit, record, statement, i tem, letter, or any other evidence which tends to prove 
the allegation of stalking. 
(5) If the court determines that there is reason to believe that an offense of stalking 
has occurred, an ex parte civil stalking injunction may be issued by the court that 
includes any of the following: 
(a) respondent may be enjoined from committing stalking; 
(b) respondent may be restrained from coming near the residence, place of 
employment, or school of the other party or specifically designated locations or 
persons; 
(c) respondent may be restrained from contacting, directly or indirectly, the other 
party, including personal, written or telephone contact with the other party, the other 
party's employers, employees, fellow workers or others with whom communication 
would be likely to cause annoyance or alarm to the other party; or 
(d) any other relief necessary or convenient for the protection of the petitioner and 
other specifically designated persons under the circumstances. 
(6) Within ten days of service of the ex parte civil stalking injunction, the respondent is 
entitled to request, in writ ing, an evidentiary hearing on the civil stalking injunction. 
(a) A hearing requested by the respondent shall be held within ten days from the date 
the request is filed with the court unless the court finds compelling reasons to 
continue the hearing. The hearing shall then be held at the earliest possible t ime. The 
burden is on the petitioner to show by a preponderance of the evidence that stalking 
of the petitioner by the respondent has occurred. 
(b) An ex parte civil stalking injunction issued under this section shall state on its 
face: 
(i) that the respondent is entitled to a hearing, upon written request within ten days 
of the service of the order; 
(ii) the name and address of the district court where the request may be f i led; 
(iii) that if the respondent fails to request a hearing within ten days of service, the 
ex parte civil stalking injunction is automatically modified to a civil stalking 
injunction without further notice to the respondent and that the civil stalking 
injunction expires three years after service of the ex parte civil stalking injunction; 
and 
(iv) that if the respondent requests, in writing, a hearing after the ten-day period 
after service, the court shall set a hearing within a reasonable time from the date 
requested. 
(7) At the hearing, the court may modify, revoke, or continue the injunction. The 
burden is on the petitioner to show by a preponderance of the evidence that stalking of 
the petitioner by the respondent has occurred. 
(8) The ex parte civil stalking injunction and civil stalking injunction shall include the 
following statement: "Attention. This is an official court order. I f you disobey this order, 
the court may find you in contempt. You may also be arrested and prosecuted for the 
crime of stalking and any other crime you may have committed in disobeying this 
order." 
(9) The ex parte civil stalking injunction shall be served on the respondent within 90 
days from the date it is signed. An ex parte civil stalking injunction is effective upon 
service. I f no hearing is requested in writing by the respondent within ten days of 
service of the ex parte civil stalking injunction, the ex parte civil stalking injunction 
automatically becomes a civil stalking injunction without further notice to the 
respondent and expires three years from the date of service of the ex parte civil 
stalking injunction. 
(10) If the respondent requests a hearing after the ten-day period after service, the 
court shall set a hearing within a reasonable time from the date requested. At the 
hearing, the burden is on the respondent to show good cause why the civil stalking 
injunction should be dissolved or modified. 
(11) Within 24 hours after the affidavit or acceptance of service has been returned, 
excluding weekends and holidays, the clerk of the court from which the ex parte civil 
stalking injunction was issued shall enter a copy of the ex parte civil stalking injunction 
and proof of service or acceptance of service in the statewide network for warrants or a 
similar system. 
(a) The effectiveness of an ex parte civil stalking injunction or civil stalking injunction 
shall not depend upon its entry in the statewide system and, for enforcement 
purposes, a certified copy of an ex parte civil stalking injunction or civil stalking 
injunction is presumed to be a valid existing order of the court for a period of three 
years from the date of service of the ex parte civil stalking injunction on the 
respondent. 
(b) Any changes or modifications of the ex parte civil stalking injunction are effective 
upon service on the respondent. The original ex parte civil stalking injunction 
continues in effect until service of the changed or modified civil stalking injunction on 
the respondent. 
(12) Within 24 hours after the affidavit or acceptance of service has been returned, 
excluding weekends and holidays, the clerk of the court shall enter a copy of the changed 
or modified civil stalking injunction and proof of service or acceptance of service in the 
statewide network for warrants or a similar system. 
(13) The ex parte civil stalking injunction or civil stalking injunction may be dissolved at 
any time upon application of the petitioner to the court which granted it. 
(14) The court clerk shall provide, without charge, to the petitioner one certified copy of 
the injunction issued by the court and one certified copy of the proof of service of the 
injunction on the respondent. Charges may be imposed by the clerk's office for any 
additional copies, certified or not certified in accordance with Rule 4-202.08 of the Code 
of Judicial Administration. 
(15) The remedies provided in this chapter for enforcement of the orders of the court are 
in addition to any other civil and criminal remedies available. The district court shall hear 
and decide all matters arising pursuant to this section. 
(16) After a hearing with notice to the affected party, the court may enter an order 
requiring any party to pay the costs of the action, including reasonable attorney's fees. 
(17) This chapter does not apply to protective orders or ex parte protective orders issued 
pursuant to Title 30, Chapter 6, Cohabitant Abuse Act, or to preliminary injunctions 
issued pursuant to an action for dissolution of marriage or legal separation. 
Laws 2001, c. 276, 6 3, eff. July 1, 2001. 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 78-27-56 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 78. Judicial Code 
Part I I I . Procedure 
^Chapter 27. Miscellaneous Provisions (Refs & Annos) 
•*§ 78-27-56. Attorney's fees—Award where action or defense in bad 
faith— Exceptions 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing 
party if the court determines that the action or defense to the action was without merit 
and not brought or asserted in good faith, except under Subsection (2). 
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a party under 
Subsection (1), but only if the court: 
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the action before the 
court; or 
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees under the 
provisions of Subsection (1). 
Laws 1981, c. 13, § 1; Laws 1988, c. 92, § 1. 
TabE 
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-5-106.5 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code 
l iChapter 5. Offenses Against The Person (Refs & Annos) 
"iiPart 1. Assault and Related Offenses 
••§ 76-5-106.5. Definitions—Stalking—Injunction—Hearing 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Course of conduct" means repeatedly maintaining a visual or physical proximity 
to a person or repeatedly conveying verbal or written threats or threats implied by 
conduct or a combination thereof directed at or toward a person. 
(b) "Immediate family" means a spouse, parent, child, sibling, or any other person 
who regularly resides in the household or who regularly resided in the household 
within the prior six months. 
(c) "Repeatedly" means on two or more occasions. 
(2) A person is guilty of stalking who: 
(a) intentionally or knowingly engages in a course of conduct directed at a specific 
person that would cause a reasonable person: 
(i) to fear bodily injury to himself or a member of his immediate family; or 
(ii) to suffer emotional distress to himself or a member of his immediate family; 
(b) has knowledge or should have knowledge that the specific person: 
(i) will be placed in reasonable fear of bodily injury to himself or a member of his 
immediate family; or 
(ii) will suffer emotional distress or a member of his immediate family will suffer 
emotional distress; and 
(c) whose conduct: 
(i) induces fear in the specific person of bodily injury to himself or a member of his 
immediate family; or 
(ii) causes emotional distress in the specific person or a member of his immediate 
family. 
(3) A person is also guilty of stalking who intentionally or knowingly violates a stalking 
injunction issued pursuant to Title 77, Chapter 3a, Stalking Injunctions, or intentionally 
or knowingly violates a permanent criminal stalking injunction issued pursuant to this 
section. 
(4) Stalking is a class A misdemeanor: 
(a) upon the offender's first violation of Subsection (2); or 
(b) if the offender violated a stalking injunction issued pursuant to Title 77, Chapter 
3a, Stalking Injunctions. 
(5) Stalking is a third degree felony if the offender: 
(a) has been previously convicted of an offense of stalking; 
(b) has been convicted in another jurisdiction of an offense that is substantially 
similar to the offense of stalking; 
(c) has been previously convicted of any felony offense in Utah or of any crime in 
another jurisdiction which if committed in Utah would be a felony, in which the victim 
of the stalking or a member of the victim's immediate family was also a victim of the 
previous felony offense; or 
(d) violated a permanent criminal stalking injunction issued pursuant to Subsection 
(7). 
(6) Stalking is a felony of the second degree if the offender: 
(a) used a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or used other means or 
force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury, in the commission of the crime 
of stalking; 
(b) has been previously convicted two or more times of the offense of stalking; 
(c) has been convicted two or more times in another jurisdiction or jurisdictions of 
offenses that are substantially similar to the offense of stalking; 
(d) has been convicted two or more times, in any combination, of offenses under 
Subsection (5) ; or 
(e) has been previously convicted two or more times of felony offenses in Utah or of 
crimes in another jurisdiction or jurisdictions which, if committed in Utah, would be 
felonies, in which the victim of the stalking was also a victim of the previous felony 
offenses. 
(7) A conviction for stalking or a plea accepted by the court and held in abeyance for a 
period of time shall operate as an application for a permanent criminal stalking 
injunction limiting the contact of the defendant and the victim. 
(a) A permanent criminal stalking injunction shall be issued without a hearing unless 
the defendant requests a hearing at the time of the verdict, finding, or plea of guilty, 
guilty and mentally i l l , plea of no contest, or acceptance of plea in abeyance. The 
court shall give the defendant notice of his right to request a hearing. 
(i) I f the defendant requests a hearing, it shall be held at the time of the verdict, 
finding, or plea of guilty, guilty and mentally i l l , plea of no contest, or acceptance of 
plea in abeyance unless the victim requests otherwise, or for good cause. 
(ii) I f the verdict, finding, or plea of guilty, guilty and mentally i l l , plea of no 
contest, or acceptance of plea in abeyance was entered in a justice court, a certified 
copy of the judgment and conviction or a certified copy of the court's order holding 
the plea in abeyance must be filed by the victim in the district court as an 
application and request for hearing for a permanent criminal stalking injunction. 
(b) A permanent criminal stalking injunction may grant the following relief: 
(i) an order restraining the defendant from entering the residence, property, school, 
or place of employment of the victim and requiring the defendant to stay away from 
the victim and members of the victim's immediate family or household and to stay 
away from any specified place that is named in the order and is frequented 
regularly by the victim; and 
(ii) an order restraining the defendant from making contact with the vict im, 
including an order forbidding the defendant from personally or through an agent 
initiating any communication likely to cause annoyance or alarm, including personal, 
written, or telephone contact with the victim, the victim's employers, employees, 
fellow workers, or others with whom communication would be likely to cause 
annoyance or alarm to the victim. 
(c) A permanent criminal stalking injunction may be dissolved upon application of the 
victim to the court which granted the order. 
(d) Notice of permanent criminal stalking injunctions issued pursuant to this section 
shall be sent by the court to the statewide warrants network or similar system. 
(e) A permanent criminal stalking injunction issued pursuant to this section shall be 
effective statewide. 
(f) Violation of an injunction issued pursuant to this section shall constitute an offense 
of stalking. Violations may be enforced in a civil action initiated by the stalking victim, 
a criminal action initiated by a prosecuting attorney, or both. 
(g) Nothing in this section shall preclude the filing of a criminal information for 
stalking based on the same act which is the basis for the violation of the stalking 
injunction issued pursuant to Title 77, Chapter 3a, Stalking Injunctions, or permanent 
criminal stalking injunction. 
Laws 1992, c. 188, § 1 ; Laws 1994, c. 206, 5 1 ; Laws 1996, c. 151, 5 1, eff. April 29, 
1996; Laws 1997, c. 10, § 129, eff. May 5, 1997; Laws 1999, c. 96, S 1, eff. May 3, 
1999; Laws 2000, c. 49, S 1, eff. May 1, 2000; Laws 2001, c. 276, 5 1. eff. July 1, 2001. 
